In mathematics, the natural numbers are the numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, and so on, possibly excluding 0. Natural numbers are sometimes called whole numbers, a term that may also refer to all integers, including the negative ones. Natural numbers are also called sometimes counting numbers, particularly in primary education. The set of the natural numbers is commonly denoted with a bold or a blackboard bold .
The natural numbers are used for counting, and for labeling the result of a count, like "there are seven days in a week", in which case they are called cardinal numeral. They are also used to label places in an ordered series, like "the third day of the month", in which case they are called ordinal numeral. Natural numbers may also be used to label, like the jersey numbers of a sports team; in this case, they have no specific mathematical properties and are called .
Two natural operations are defined on natural numbers, addition and multiplication. Arithmetic is the study of the ways to perform these operations. Number theory is the study of the properties of these operations and their generalizations. Much of combinatorics involves counting mathematical objects, patterns and structures that are defined using natural numbers.
Many are built from the natural numbers and contain them. For example, the are made by including 0 and negative numbers. The add fractions, and the add all infinite decimals. add the Imaginary unit. says: "The whole fantastic hierarchy of number systems is built up by purely set-theoretic means from a few simple assumptions about natural numbers." This makes up natural numbers as foundational for all mathematics.: "Numbers make up the foundation of mathematics."
The natural number 3 is the thing used for the particular cardinal number described above and for the cardinal number of any other collection of objects that could be paired off in the same way to one of these groups.
The natural number 3 then is the thing that comes after 2 and 1, and before 4, 5 and so on. The number 2 is the thing that comes after 1, and 1 is the first element in the sequence. Each number represents the relation that position bears to the rest of the infinite sequence.
The first major advance in abstraction was the use of numeral system to represent numbers. This allowed systems to be developed for recording large numbers. The ancient Egyptians developed a powerful system of numerals with distinct hieroglyphs for 1, 10, and all powers of 10 up to over 1 million. A stone carving from Karnak, dating back from around 1500 BCE and now at the Louvre in Paris, depicts 276 as 2 hundreds, 7 tens, and 6 ones; and similarly for the number 4,622. The had a place-value system based essentially on the numerals for 1 and 10, using base sixty, so that the symbol for sixty was the same as the symbol for one—its value being determined from context.
A much later advance was the development of the idea that can be considered as a number, with its own numeral. The use of a 0 numerical digit in place-value notation (within other numbers) dates back as early as 700 BCE by the Babylonians, who omitted such a digit when it would have been the last symbol in the number. The Olmec and Maya civilizations used 0 as a separate number as early as the , but this usage did not spread beyond Mesoamerica. The use of a numeral 0 in modern times originated with the Indian mathematician Brahmagupta in 628 CE. However, 0 had been used as a number in the medieval computus (the calculation of the date of Easter), beginning with Dionysius Exiguus in 525 CE, without being denoted by a numeral. Standard Roman numerals do not have a symbol for 0; instead, nulla (or the genitive form nullae) from nullus, the Latin word for "none", was employed to denote a 0 value.
The first systematic study of numbers as is usually credited to the ancient Greece philosophers Pythagoras and Archimedes. Some Greek mathematicians treated the number 1 differently than larger numbers, sometimes even not as a number at all. Euclid, for example, defined a unit first and then a number as a multitude of units, thus by his definition, a unit is not a number and there are no unique numbers (e.g., any two units from indefinitely many units is a 2). However, in the definition of perfect number which comes shortly afterward, Euclid treats 1 as a number like any other. In definition VII.3 a "part" was defined as a number, but here 1 is considered to be a part, so that for example is a perfect number.
Independent studies on numbers also occurred at around the same time in India, China, and Mesoamerica.
Starting at 0 or 1 has long been a matter of definition. In 1727, Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle wrote that his notions of distance and element led to defining the natural numbers as including or excluding 0. In 1889, Giuseppe Peano used N for the positive integers and started at 1, but he later changed to using N0 and N1. Historically, most definitions have excluded 0, but many mathematicians such as George A. Wentworth, Bertrand Russell, Nicolas Bourbaki, Paul Halmos, Stephen Cole Kleene, and John Horton Conway have preferred to include 0.
Mathematicians have noted tendencies in which definition is used, such as algebra texts including 0, number theory and analysis texts excluding 0,See, for example, or logic and set theory texts including 0,
The constructivists saw a need to improve upon the logical rigor in the foundations of mathematics. In the 1860s, Hermann Grassmann suggested a recursive definition for natural numbers, thus stating they were not really natural—but a consequence of definitions. Later, two classes of such formal definitions emerged, using set theory and Peano's axioms respectively. Later still, they were shown to be equivalent in most practical applications.
Set-theoretical definitions of natural numbers were initiated by Gottlob Frege. He initially defined a natural number as the class of all sets that are in one-to-one correspondence with a particular set. However, this definition turned out to lead to paradoxes, including Russell's paradox. To avoid such paradoxes, the formalism was modified so that a natural number is defined as a particular set, and any set that can be put into one-to-one correspondence with that set is said to have that number of elements.
In 1881, Charles Sanders Peirce provided the first axiomatization of natural-number arithmetic. In 1888, Richard Dedekind proposed another axiomatization of natural-number arithmetic, and in 1889, Peano published a simplified version of Dedekind's axioms in his book The principles of arithmetic presented by a new method (). This approach is now called Peano arithmetic. It is based on an axiomatization of the properties of : each natural number has a successor and every non-zero natural number has a unique predecessor. Peano arithmetic is equiconsistent with several weak systems of set theory. One such system is ZFC with the axiom of infinity replaced by its negation. Theorems that can be proved in ZFC but cannot be proved using the Peano Axioms include Goodstein's theorem.
Since natural numbers may contain or not, it may be important to know which version is referred to. This is often specified by the context, but may also be done by using a subscript or a superscript in the notation, possibly with reference to the Examples include:
The sets used to define natural numbers satisfy the Peano axioms. It follows that every theorem that can be stated and proved in Peano arithmetic can also be proved in set theory. However, the two definitions are not equivalent, as there are theorems that can be stated in terms of Peano arithmetic and proved in set theory, which are not provable inside Peano arithmetic. A probable example is Fermat's Last Theorem.
The definition of the integers as sets satisfying the Peano axioms provide a model of Peano arithmetic inside set theory. An important consequence is that, if set theory is consistent (as is usually assumed), then Peano arithmetic is consistent. In other words, if a contradiction could be proved in Peano arithmetic, then set theory would be logically inconsistent.
These are not the original axioms published by Peano, but are named in his honor. Some forms of the Peano axioms have 1 in place of 0. In ordinary arithmetic, the successor of is .
The following definition was first published by John von Neumann, although Levy attributes the idea to unpublished work of Zermelo in 1916. As this definition extends to infinite set as a definition of ordinal number, the sets considered below are sometimes called von Neumann ordinals.
The definition proceeds as follows:
It follows that the natural numbers are defined iteratively as follows:
It can be checked that the natural numbers satisfy the Peano axioms.
With this definition, given a natural number , the sentence "a set has elements" can be formally defined as "there exists a bijection from to ." This formalizes the operation of counting the elements of . Also, if and only if is a subset of . In other words, the set inclusion defines the usual total order on the natural numbers. This order is a well-order.
It follows from the definition that each natural number is equal to the set of all natural numbers less than it. This definition, can be extended to the von Neumann definition of ordinals for defining all , including the infinite ones: "each ordinal is the well-ordered set of all smaller ordinals."
If one finitism, the natural numbers may not form a set. Nevertheless, the natural numbers can still be individually defined as above, and they still satisfy the Peano axioms.
There are other set theoretical constructions. In particular, Ernst Zermelo provided a construction that is nowadays only of historical interest, and is sometimes referred to as . It consists in defining as the empty set, and .
With this definition each nonzero natural number is a singleton set. So, the property of the natural numbers to represent cardinalities is not directly accessible; only the ordinal property (being the th element of a sequence) is immediate. Unlike von Neumann's construction, the Zermelo ordinals do not extend to infinite ordinals.
If 1 is defined as , then . That is, is simply the successor of .
If the natural numbers are taken as "excluding 0", and "starting at 1", the definitions of + and × are as above, except that they begin with and . Furthermore, has no identity element.
A total order on the natural numbers is defined by letting if and only if there exists another natural number where . This order is compatible with the arithmetical operations in the following sense: if , and are natural numbers and , then and .
An important property of the natural numbers is that they are : every non-empty set of natural numbers has a least element. The rank among well-ordered sets is expressed by an ordinal number; for the natural numbers, this is denoted as (omega).
While it is in general not possible to divide one natural number by another and get a natural number as result, the procedure of division with remainder or Euclidean division is available as a substitute: for any two natural numbers and with there are natural numbers and such that
The number is called the quotient and is called the remainder of the division of by . The numbers and are uniquely determined by and . This Euclidean division is key to the several other properties (divisibility), algorithms (such as the Euclidean algorithm), and ideas in number theory.
These two uses of natural numbers apply only to . Georg Cantor discovered at the end of the 19th century that both uses of natural numbers can be generalized to , but that they lead to two different concepts of "infinite" numbers, the and the .
Other generalizations of natural numbers are discussed in .
Formal construction
Notation
Definitions
Peano axioms
Set-theoretic definition
Properties
Addition
Multiplication
Relationship between addition and multiplication
Order
Division
Algebraic properties satisfied by the natural numbers
Generalizations
See also
Notes
Bibliography
External links
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